Continuing Commercial Impression: Applications and Measurement by Mark, Gideon & Jacoby, Jacob
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 3 Article 1
Continuing Commercial Impression: Applications
and Measurement
Gideon Mark
Jacob Jacoby
Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University;
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Gideon Mark and Jacob Jacoby, Continuing Commercial Impression: Applications and Measurement , 10 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 433
(2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol10/iss3/1
MARK.JACOBY ARTICLE - FORMATTED 6/3/2006 4:55:05 PM 
 
 
ARTICLES 
CONTINUING COMMERCIAL 
IMPRESSION:  APPLICATIONS AND 
MEASUREMENT* 
GIDEON MARK** & JACOB JACOBY*** 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 434 
I.  THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUING COMMERCIAL IMPRESSION ........ 435 
  A.  Abandonment...................................................................................... 435 
  B.  Tacking ................................................................................................ 437 
  C.  Continuing Commercial Impression:  Some Applications .............. 444 
II.  EMPIRICALLY DETERMINING CONTINUING 
       COMMERCIAL IMPRESSION................................................................. 449 
  A.  Kubota Corp. et al. v. DaeDong-USA, Inc. .................................... 449 
     1.  The Secondary Meaning Survey ..................................................... 450 
     2.  The Continuing Commercial Impression Survey ......................... 453 
  B.  In re Lawman Armor Corp. .............................................................. 455 
  C.  Insights Gained by Comparing the Surveys 
        in Kubota and Lawman Armor ........................................................ 456 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS................................................................. 457 
 
* This work was sponsored, in part, by a Brand Names Educational Foundation scholarship 
awarded through the International Trademark Association. 
** Practicing attorney, New York City.  Mr. Mark holds degrees from Brandeis University, 
Columbia University, Harvard University, New York University, and the University of 
California. 
*** Merchants Council Professor of Consumer Behavior and Retail Management, Leonard 
N. Stern School of Business, New York University; President of Jacob Jacoby Research, Inc. 
MARK.JACOBY ARTICLE - FORMATTED 6/3/2006  4:55:05 PM 
434 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the Lanham Act, abandonment of a trademark occurs in two 
general situations.  In the first, a mark is deemed abandoned if its “use 
has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use.”1  In the 
second, a mark is deemed abandoned “[w]hen any course of conduct of 
the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the 
mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in 
connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a 
mark.”2 
The first situation focuses on the intent of the trademark owner not 
to resume use.  In many cases, the intent not to resume use is proved 
circumstantially “with the necessary inference being drawn from a 
showing of a sustained period of non-use.”3  The Lanham Act 
specifically provides that nonuse for three consecutive years shall be 
prima facie evidence of abandonment.4  While the intent of the 
trademark owner is determinative, the perspective of the consuming 
public also is, or should be, relevant.  “[A trademark is] a shorthand way 
that merchants communicate data to the public about the attributes and 
qualities of their goods and services.  If a mark continues to have such 
significance to the public, a court should hesitate to declare it 
abandoned.”5 
In determining whether a mark continues to have such significance, 
courts and administrative tribunals often attempt to assess whether the 
mark has a “continuing commercial impression.”6  The “commercial 
impression” of a trademark is the meaning or idea it conveys or the 
mental reaction it evokes.7  “Continuing commercial impression” may 
manifest in one of two ways.  In the first instance, although a mark has 
not been used for a period of time, the public continues to have accurate 
lingering impressions associated with it.  An example is Rheingold beer.  
 
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
2. Id. 
3. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  THE 
LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 757 (2003). 
4. § 1127.  “‘Use’ of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary 
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”  Id.  “Thus, neither 
promotional use of the mark on goods in a different course of trade nor mere token use 
constitutes ‘use’ under the Lanham Act.”  Iowa Health Sys. v. Trinity Health Corp., 177 F. 
Supp. 2d 897, 919 (N.D. Iowa 2001). 
5. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 3, at 759. 
6. Spice Islands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293, 1296 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
7. Id. 
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Although the beer is no longer manufactured and sold, many New 
Yorkers over the age of fifty—whether they were beer drinkers or not—
remember Rheingold and its long-running sponsorship of the famous 
“Miss Subways” campaign.  In the second instance, corporations 
periodically make slight modifications to their marks and trade dress, 
often in an effort to update and modernize them.  Famous examples are 
the likeness of Betty Crocker and the trade dress of Ivory Soap, both of 
which have undergone numerous iterations since their inceptions. 
Judicial efforts to assess continuing commercial impression are the 
subject of this Article.  The Article first examines the development of 
the doctrine and its application by the judiciary.  Then, the Article 
discusses two rare empirical assessments of continuing commercial 
impression in connection with trade dress and word-mark infringement.8 
I.  THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUING COMMERCIAL IMPRESSION 
A.  Abandonment 
Abandonment destroys a trademark, with the effect that anyone has 
the right to seize it immediately and acquire rights superior to the rest of 
the world.9  Whereas the first Lanham Act situation described above 
focuses on intent, the latter does not.  As indicated, in the first instance, 
abandonment may be found when the use of a mark has been 
discontinued with intent not to resume such use.  The prima facie case 
of abandonment that results from three consecutive years of nonuse 
may be “rebutted by showing valid reasons for nonuse or lack of intent 
to abandon the mark.”10  Abandonment is generally determined by 
 
8. Commercial impression is relevant in a wide range of trademark contexts.  See 
generally David W. Barnes & Teresa A. Laky, Classic Fair Use of Trademarks:  Confusion 
About Defenses, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 833, 857 n.91 (2004) 
(stating that commercial impression is relevant, inter alia, to determine whether “trade dress 
is used as a mark, . . . a combination of descriptive and other unregisterable components of a 
term together create a distinctive enough impact to qualify as a mark, [and] amendments to a 
registered trademark constitute impermissible material alterations”).  See also In re Shirts 
Illustrated, L.L.C., Serial No. 75/708,75, 2003 WL 21371594 (T.T.A.B. June 10, 2003) (denying 
descriptive mark registration, in part, because it did not create the same continuing 
commercial impression as another mark). 
9. 3 LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES § 20:75 (4th ed. 2004); Alliant Energy Corp. v. Alltel Corp., 344 F. Supp. 2d 
1176, 1189 (S.D. Iowa 2004). 
10. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1996).  “In some 
circuits, a showing of nonuse shifts the burden of persuasion to the trademark owner to show 
intent to resume; in others, . . . prima facie abandonment creates only a rebuttable 
presumption of abandonment.”  Id. at 411 n.4; see Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335 F.3d 
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objective, rather than subjective, factors.  Hence, an owner’s testimony 
concerning lack of intent to abandon may be rebutted by objective, 
contrary evidence.11 
In the second situation, the Lanham Act provides that abandonment 
may be premised upon any act or omission of the registrant that causes 
the mark to lose its significance as an indicator of origin.12  A trademark 
may be abandoned expressly13 or inadvertently by uncontrolled or 
naked licensing,14 misuse, mutilation of the mark, or nonuse.  
Conversely, failure to police infringement generally does not constitute 
abandonment.15  Intent is not relevant with respect to any of the 
foregoing.16  Abandonment is effective even if the goodwill of the mark 
 
633, 639 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Goldman, Serial No. 76206220, 2005 WL 
2295194, at *7 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2005) (“While the burden to produce evidence shifts, the 
burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the party asserting 
abandonment.”). 
11. Sloan v. Auditron Elec. Corp., 68 F. App’x 386, 391 (4th Cir. 2003); 2 W. MICHAEL 
GARNER, FRANCHISE & DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:17 (2004). 
12. Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1079 (5th Cir. 1997). 
13. Express abandonment (withdrawal) of application, 37 C.F.R. § 2.68 (2005). 
14. Naked licenses are those licenses that fail to exercise adequate quality control over 
use by the licensee.  Doeblers’ Penn. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, No. 04-3848, 2006 WL 722156, 
at *8 (3d Cir. Mar. 26, 2006); Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Importers, Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 595–96 (9th Cir. 2002).  
“A licensor who engages in naked licensing abandons the trademark or trade name.”  Ritchie 
v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 290 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Westco Group, Inc. v. K.B. & Assocs., 
Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (N.D. Ohio 2001)).  However, the majority view is that “the 
existence of a legal right of the licensor to control the quality of its licensee’s activities is 
neither necessary nor sufficient, since it is the control in fact of the quality of the licensee’s 
goods or services that is dispositive.”  Id. (quoting Edward K. Esping, Annotation, Granting 
of “Naked” or Unsupervised License to Third Party As Abandonment of Trademark, 118 
A.L.R. FED. 211 (2004)).  “The lack of an express contractual right to inspect and supervise a 
licensee’s operations is not conclusive evidence of lack of control. . . . Indeed, ‘[c]ourts have 
upheld licensing agreements where the licensor is familiar with and relies upon the licensee’s 
own efforts to control quality.’”  Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust, 289 F.3d at 596 (quoting 
Morgan Creek Prods., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1884 
(C.D. Cal. 1991)). 
15. See, e.g., SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 3, at 759 (“While the failure to sue 
infringers might jeopardize a mark owner’s ability to protect its mark or prevail in any given 
lawsuit, it does not technically constitute abandonment.”); Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie 
Corner, 244 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1095 (D. Haw. 2003) (“In the Ninth Circuit, however, failure to 
sue other potential infringers does not constitute abandonment.”); Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. 
Detroit Forming, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039, 1047–48 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that a failure to police 
does not constitute abandonment).  For a recent discussion of naked licensing and policing, 
see Rudolph J. Kuss, Comment, The Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed:  How Courts 
Interpret the Lanham Act to Require Licensors to Police Their Licensees & Why This 
Requirement Conflicts with Modern Licensing Realities & the Goals of Trademark Law, 9 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 361 (2005). 
16. See, e.g., Exxon Corp., 109 F.3d at 1080 (“[I]ntent to abandon is expressly not 
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survives.17 
Rights in a mark may be abandoned in specific geographic areas but 
not others.18  When nonuse is due to circumstances beyond the control 
of the trademark owner, no abandonment will be found.  A plaintiff 
“who abandoned a mark will be entitled to relief if he replaces the mark 
with another, but confusingly similar, mark, and adoption of the 
abandoned mark . . . took place after the plaintiff’s adoption of the 
replacement mark.”19  Abandonment is an affirmative defense.  Because 
it is in the nature of a forfeiture, courts often state that a party must 
satisfy a strict standard of proof when asserting that a trademark holder 
has abandoned his mark.20  This is particularly true when the trademark 
owner had no subjective intent to abandon the mark, as in the case of 
naked licensing.21 
B.  Tacking 
A number of federal courts have recognized the doctrine of 
“tacking” in trademark cases, pursuant to which a trademark owner can 
claim priority in a mark based on the first-use date of a similar, but 
technically distinct mark.  Under this constructive-use theory, the 
trademark owner seeks to tack his first-use date in the earlier mark onto 
the subsequent mark.22  Tacking does not apply when a plaintiff does not 
 
required to prove abandonment by [naked licensing]”). 
17. 3 ALTMAN, supra note 9, § 20:75. 
18. Tumblebus Inc., 399 F.3d at 765. 
19. 3 ALTMAN, supra note 9, § 20:75. 
20. See, e.g., Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 198 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Cash 
Processing Servs. v. Ambient Entm’t, No. 3:04 CV 0490 ECR EAM, 2006 WL 449213, at *3 
(D. Nev. Feb. 23, 2006) (finding that a majority of courts require strict proof of abandonment, 
and majority of those courts require that evidence of abandonment be clear and convincing); 
Hawaii-Pacific Apparel Group, Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., No. 04 CIV. 
7863(DC), 2006 WL 488569, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2006) (concluding that abandonment 
constitutes forfeiture of a property right and, thus, must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence).  Other courts require that abandonment be proven by the lesser standard of a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. FireEagle, Ltd., 228 
F.3d 531, 536 (4th Cir. 2000). 
21. See, e.g., Tumblebus Inc., 399 F.3d at 765; Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc. v. 
Pure Country, Inc., No. IP 01-1054-C-B/F, 2004 WL 3391781, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 26, 2004); 
Halo Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Interland, Inc., No. C-03-1106 MHP, 2004 WL 1781013, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 10, 2004); see also 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17:12 (4th ed. 2004) (“Since abandonment results in a forfeiture of 
rights, the courts are reluctant to find an abandonment.”). 
22. See generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, §§ 17:25–:27.  For an early discussion of 
tacking, see Saul Lefkowitz, Tips from the TTAB, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 530 (1976) 
(regarding tacking of use). 
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assert priority of use in connection with a new mark.23  When tacking 
applies, it provides an effective defense to a claim of abandonment. 
Sound policy considerations support the notion of tacking.  Absent 
the doctrine, a trademark owner’s priority in his mark “would be 
reduced each time he made the slightest alteration to the mark, which 
would discourage him from altering the mark in response to changing 
consumer preferences, evolving aesthetic developments, or new 
advertising and marketing styles.”24  Further, granting a trademark 
owner the same rights in a new mark that he has in an old mark “helps 
to protect source-identifying trademarks from appropriation by 
competitors and thus furthers the trademark law’s objective of reducing 
the costs that customers incur in shopping and making purchasing 
decisions.”25 
Courts have frequently specified that the standard for tacking is very 
strict.  In Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp.,26 decided in 1991, 
the Federal Circuit set forth a test that has been widely applied in that 
circuit and elsewhere in subsequent years.27  The Federal Circuit stated 
that, in order for tacking to apply, “[t]he marks must create the same 
continuing commercial impression, and the later mark should not 
materially differ from or alter the mark attempted to be tacked.”28  In 
addition, “[t]he previously used mark must be the legal equivalent of the 
mark in question or indistinguishable therefrom, and the consumer 
should consider both as the same mark.”29 
It follows that improper tacking is an attempt to tack marks that are 
not legal equivalents conveying the same continuing commercial 
impression.  The effect of improper tacking is the same as the effect of 
abandonment—“the owner of the senior mark can no longer claim 
priority from the date of use of the senior mark.”30  The party seeking to 
tack bears the burden of establishing the required elements.31 
 
23. Levi Strauss & Co. v. GTFM, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 971, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
24. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 
1999); accord Levi Strauss & Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d at 984. 
25. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1048. 
26. 926 F.2d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
27. See id. at 1159. 
28. Id. at 1159 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
29. Id.  The court applied the foregoing standard and determined as a matter of law 
that the mark CLOTHES THAT WORK was not the legal equivalent for tacking purposes of 
“CLOTHES THAT WORK.  FOR THE WORK YOU DO.”  Id. at 1160. 
30. Iowa Health Sys. v. Trinity Health Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 897, 921 (N.D. Iowa 
2001). 
31. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., No. 96 C 6922, 1998 WL 911776, 
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In Navistar International Transportation Corp. v. Freightliner Corp.,32 
the district court set forth a somewhat different three-part test for 
applying tacking:  “(1) do the marks make the same commercial 
impression?; (2) are the two impressions continuous?; and finally, (3) 
are the marks being used on the same or substantially similar goods or 
services?”33  With respect to the second prong, the court clarified that 
the same impression must continue from the old mark to the new 
mark.34  Navistar also determined that the doctrine of legal equivalents 
had no place in the tacking inquiry.35 
Because the tacking standard, whatever its precise formulation, is so 
strict,36 tacking claims are generally unsuccessful.37  Indeed, the tacking 
standard enunciated in Van Dyne-Crotty “is considerably higher than 
the standard for ‘likelihood of confusion’”38 that is generally applied to 
determine whether trademark infringement has occurred.  “[T]wo 
marks may not be legal equivalents even if they are found to be 
confusingly similar.”39  For example, the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 1998); accord Yeager Fuel, Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 22 F.3d 
1260, 1266 (3d Cir. 1994). 
32. Navistar, 1998 WL 911776, at *1. 
33. Id. at *3 (footnotes omitted). 
34. Id. at *3 n.6. 
35. As set forth in Navistar, the doctrine of legal equivalents “holds that trademark 
rights in a picture mark encompass rights in a word if the picture evokes the mental 
impression of the word (or vice versa).”  Id. at *5.  According to Navistar, this doctrine is 
distinct from continuing commercial impression.  Id.  In one recent case, the Board identified 
two separate tacking standards—“prior use of the salient feature of a trade name, . . . or prior 
use of a trademark legally equivalent to a current mark.”  Chesapeake Bank v. Chesapeake 
Bank of Maryland, Oppos. No. 91114353, 2004 WL 240313, at *10 n.13 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 
2004). 
36. McCarthy notes that “[i]n the late 1980s, the Trademark Board and the Federal 
Circuit began to apply the continuing commercial impression test with much more rigor and 
strictness than in the past.”  2 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 17:26; see also Think Computer 
Corp. v. H. Co. Computer Prods., Inc., Oppos. No. 91125553, 2004 WL 2368482, at *3 
(T.T.A.B. May 28, 2004) (requiring proof of tacking by clear and convincing evidence, at least 
when prior use is asserted). 
37. Melissa M. McGann, Casenote, Web Word War (WWW):  A New Approach to 
Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition Claims Under the Lanham Act in Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 363, 
378 n.95 (2000); accord Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 623–24 
(6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that tacking is permitted in rare circumstances); Levi Strauss & 
Co. v. GTFM, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 971, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that tacking is allowed 
only in “exceptionally narrow” circumstances). 
38. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 
1999); Navistar, 1998 WL 911776, at *4 (“[T]he standard for tacking is ‘far higher than the 
likelihood of confusion standard’ . . . .”). 
39. HGI Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., Nos. 93-55968, 93-56370, 1995 WL 89385, 
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Board (Board) determined that the marks PRO-CUTS and PRO-KUT 
were confusingly similar, but not legal equivalents.40  The Board noted 
differences between the marks in spelling and pluralization as well as 
material differences in the design features.41  Accordingly, tacking was 
not allowed.42 
Courts apply a list of factors to determine a “likelihood of 
confusion.”43  While the list varies from circuit to circuit, the factors 
typically include some combination of the following:  similarity of the 
conflicting designations; relatedness or proximity of the two companies’ 
products or services; strength of the plaintiff’s mark; marketing channels 
used; degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers in selecting 
goods; defendant’s intent in selecting its mark; evidence of actual 
confusion; and the likelihood of expansion in product lines.44 
The various multi-factor tests for assessing “likelihood of confusion” 
provide essential guidance to courts making such an assessment.  Courts 
determining whether tacking is available have a more difficult time 
because no comparable multi-factor test has been developed.  
Nevertheless, some guidelines have emerged over the years as courts 
have sought to apply the Van Dyne-Crotty standard. 
A threshold question is whether “legal equivalence” is a question of 
law or a question of fact.  To date, courts have reached conflicting 
conclusions with regard to this issue on the basis of limited analysis.  In 
In re DIAL-A-MATTRESS Operating Corp.,45 decided in 2001, the 
Federal Circuit reversed the rejection of an intent-to-use application to 
register 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S as a service mark.  In so doing, the court 
determined that the proposed mark was merely descriptive of the 
recited services and, therefore, was registerable only upon a showing of 
 
at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 1995); Lincoln Logs, Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-Cut Log Homes, Inc., 971 F.2d 
732, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that no tacking was allowed because LINCOLN LOGS 
LTD. and profile/log cabin design was not the legal equivalent of THE ORIGINAL 
LINCOLN LOGS LTD. and house design); Ushodaya Enters., Ltd. v. V.R.S. Int’l, Inc., 63 F. 
Supp. 2d 329, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
40. Pro-Cuts v. Schilz-Price Enters., Inc., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224, 1227 (T.T.A.B. 
1993). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
44. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982). 
45. 240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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acquired distinctiveness.46  Then, the court applied Trademark Rule 
2.41(b), which provides that “[i]n appropriate cases, ownership of one or 
more prior registrations on the Principal Register or under the Act of 
1905 of the same mark may be accepted as prima facie evidence of 
distinctiveness.”47 
The court then held that a proposed mark is the “same mark” as 
previously registered marks for the purpose of Trademark Rule 2.41(b) 
if it is the “legal equivalent” of another, and if it creates the same 
continuing commercial impression such that the consumer would 
consider them both the same mark.48  According to the court, whether 
marks are legal equivalents is a question of law.49  The court cited its 
prior decision in Van Dyne-Crotty for the proposition that no evidence 
need be entertained other than the visual or aural appearance of the 
marks themselves.50  On the basis of such evidence, the court concluded 
that the marks 1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S and (212) M-A-T-T-R-E-S were 
legal equivalents.51 
The Sixth Circuit has agreed with the Federal Circuit that legal 
equivalence is a pure question of law.52  That conclusion seems infirm.  
Marks are deemed to be legal equivalents if they create the same 
continuing commercial impression.  The impression is one that is 
created in consumers.53  Insofar as the consumers’ perspective is 
 
46. Id. at 1344. 
47. Proof of distinctiveness under section 2(f), 37 C.F.R. § 2.41(b) (2000).  While 
ownership of existing registrations to establish acquired distinctiveness may be considered 
acceptable in appropriate cases under Rule 2.41(b), the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
may, at its option, require additional evidence of distinctiveness.  In re DIAL-A-MATTRESS 
Operating Corp., 240 F.3d at 1347; In re Candy Bouquet Int’l, Inc., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1883, 1889 (T.T.A.B. 2004). 
48. In re DIAL-A-MATTRESS Operating Corp., 240 F.3d at 1347. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. See Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(“A determination of legal equivalence may be based on ‘the visual or aural appearance of 
the marks themselves.’”).  In Data Concepts, Inc., the court determined that a software 
company’s use of the mark “DCI” in its Internet address DCI.COM was not the legal 
equivalent of the company’s prior use of the stylized trademark “dci.”  The Data Concepts 
case is discussed in Robin W. Foster, Note, A Seamless Web of Confusion:  The Sixth Circuit 
Obfuscates the Law in Applying Trademark Principles to Internet Domain Name Conflicts in 
the Opinion of Data Concepts Inc. v. Digital Consulting Inc., 26 N. KY. L. REV. 305, 316 
(1999).  See also Gaffrig Performance Indus., Inc. v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., No. 99 C 7778, 2001 
WL 709483, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2001) (stating that legal equivalence is a question of law); 
Keycorp v. Key Bank & Trust, 99 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
53. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 
(9th Cir. 1999) (“We agree that tacking should be allowed if two marks are so similar that 
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determinative, it seems counter-intuitive to conclude, as have the 
Federal and Sixth Circuits, that the only relevant evidence is that of the 
visual or aural appearance of the marks themselves. 
Rather, the determination of whether marks are legal equivalents 
should be a mixed question of fact and law, and the existence of a 
continuing commercial impression for purposes of tacking, Rule 
2.41(b),54 claim preclusion,55 a Morehouse defense,56 and other contexts 
 
consumers generally would regard them as essentially the same.”).  The Brookfield case is 
discussed in Shannon N. King, Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast 
Entertainment Corp., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313 (2000), and McGann, supra note 37. 
54. The analysis under Rule 2.41(b) is essentially the same as the analysis for 
determining whether tacking applies.  See In re Lawman Armor Corp., Serial No. 75982984, 
2005 WL 2451654 (T.T.A.B. June 15, 2005); In re Merion Publ’ns, Inc., Serial Nos. 75/629,629, 
75/630,793, 75/854,084, 2002 WL 31375534 (T.T.A.B. June 25, 2002); In re Gear Int’l Trading 
Co., Serial Nos. 75/459,796, 75/459,797, 2001 WL 741709 (T.T.A.B. June 29, 2001); 
PRACTITIONER’S TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212.04(b) (James 
E. Hawkes ann., 2002) (“A proposed mark is the same mark as a previously-registered mark 
for the purpose of 37 C.F.R. § 2.41(b) if it is the ‘legal equivalent’ of such a mark.  A mark is 
the legal equivalent of another if it creates the same, continuing commercial impression such 
that the consumer would consider them both the same mark.”).  Likewise, the analysis is 
essentially the same as that used to determine whether a proposed amendment to a mark 
would constitute an impermissible material alteration.  See In re Dial A Mattress Operating 
Corp., Serial No. 75/131,355, 1999 WL 1186220, at *7 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 1999) (“In all of these 
situations, the issue is whether the present mark and the previous mark are ‘legal 
equivalents,’ i.e., whether they create the same continuing commercial impression such that 
the consumer would consider both as the same mark.”). 
55. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion or res judicata, the entry of a final judgment 
on the merits in a proceeding serves to preclude the relitigation of the same claim in a 
subsequent proceeding between the parties or their privies.  See Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. 
Kenneth Gordon, Ltd., 736 F.2d 694 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  A second suit is barred under res 
judicata if:  (1) the parties (or their privies) are identical; (2) there has been an earlier final 
judgment on a claim; and (3) the second claim is based on the same set of transactional facts 
as the first.  Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  The Board has 
held that in comparing two marks to determine if the same claim arose for purposes of claim 
preclusion, it will apply the tacking standard to assess whether a continuing commercial 
impression exists.  See Institut National Des Appellations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1875, 1894–96 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (holding that (1) “the proper test for 
determining whether two marks have the same commercial impression, for purposes of the 
claim preclusion doctrine, is the test used in tacking situations, i.e., whether the marks are 
legal equivalents” and (2) MIST AND COGNAC mark is a different mark, in terms of 
commercial impression, from CANADIAN MIST AND COGNAC); see also Bank One 
Corp. v. Charter One Fin. Inc., Oppos. No. 91125355, 2004 WL 902116, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 
20, 2004) (finding no claim preclusion because two marks did not create same continuing 
commercial impression); Polaroid Corp. v. C&E Vision Servs., Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1954 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (same). 
56. The Morehouse defense, an equitable affirmative defense, is available in situations 
in which the applicant already owns a registration for the same mark for substantially 
identical goods and services.  It is based on the theory that a registration opposer cannot be 
injured by the registration sought because there already exists a similar registration and, 
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should be tested by a range of evidence—including consumer survey 
evidence, if it is available.  Whether a likelihood of confusion exists is a 
mixed question of law and fact.57  This question is often resolved in 
modern trademark litigation with the use of survey evidence.  While 
“there is no flat rule that a survey must be introduced to obtain a 
preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, or to recover damages[,] 
. . . an increasing number of opinions expressly rely upon survey 
evidence to substantiate the decision.”58 
Today, issues concerning survey evidence primarily relate to survey 
design and methodology.  Methodological errors in trademark surveys 
generally go only to the weight of the evidence, rather than to its 
admissibility, unless the survey is so flawed that its probative value is 
outweighed by the risk of prejudice.59  Similarly, the determination of 
whether marks are legal equivalents should be a mixed question of law 
and fact, and survey evidence generally should be admissible to assess 
the existence of a continuing commercial impression.  Surveys can 
 
therefore, an additional registration for the same mark for substantially identical goods and 
services can no more injure the plaintiff than the prior registration.  See Morehouse Mfg. 
Corp. v. J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (finding no injury from registration 
of BLUE MAGIC for pressing oil when applicant owned prior registration for BLUE 
MAGIC for hair dressing); see also O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 65 F.3d 933 
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Teledyne Tech., Inc. v. Western Skyways, Inc., Cancel. No. 92041265, 2006 
WL 337553, at *8 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 2, 2006); Univ. of S. Cal. v. Univ. of S.C., Oppos. No. 
91125615, 2005 WL 1402094 (T.T.A.B. June 13, 2005).  In determining whether a Morehouse 
defense is available, courts and the Board have assessed whether a continuing commercial 
impression exists.  See, e.g., Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tillamook County Creamery 
Ass’n, 333 F. Supp. 2d 975, 987 (D. Or. 2004) (“In summary, decisions applying the prior-
registration doctrine indicate that whether two marks are ‘substantially identical’ turns in part 
on whether consumers would find that each mark conveys the same commercial 
impression.”); S & L Acquisition Co. v. Helene Arpels, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1221 
(T.T.A.B. 1987); see also Advance Stores Co. v. Refinishing Specialties, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 643, 
654 (W.D. Ky. 1996), aff’d, 188 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[M]ere stylization of a name, or the 
addition of a design element, is insufficient to defeat Morehouse defense.”); Bank One Corp., 
2004 WL 902116, at *6 (finding the Morehouse defense inapplicable because subject marks 
were not substantially identical—they were not literally identical or legally equivalent); Big 
Blue Prods. Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (T.T.A.B. 1991) 
(finding that the tacking and Morehouse analyses are analogous). 
57. See, e.g., Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 570 (6th Cir. 
1987). 
58. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 32:195 (citations omitted). 
59. Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Kenneth A. 
Plevan, Daubert’s Impact on Survey Experts in Lanham Act Litigation, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 
596 (2005) (studying reported Lanham Act decisions during the period 1997–2004 and finding 
that fourteen such decisions excluded survey evidence altogether, while in thirty cases the 
admissibility of a survey was challenged but the survey was not excluded); Jacob Jacoby, 
Experimental Design and Selection of Controls in Trademark and Deceptive Advertising 
Surveys, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 890 (2002). 
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provide the most accurate means of assessing such impressions.60 
Some courts have concluded that the question of tacking is a 
question of fact, rather than law.61  They have done so, appropriately, on 
the basis that the impressions of consumers are as critical as they are 
with respect to the likelihood of confusion test for infringement.62  The 
Navistar court stated:  “Because the inquiry is how consumers perceive 
the marks, there must be some evidence demonstrating those 
perceptions.”63 
C.  Continuing Commercial Impression:  Some Applications 
A few trends or rules have emerged from the efforts of courts to 
apply the continuing commercial impression doctrine in trademark law, 
particularly in the context of abandonment and tacking.  First, a user 
who changes only the form of its mark can retain the benefit of its use of 
the earlier form if the two forms create the same impression.  When the 
“distinctive character of the mark is not changed, the mark is, in effect, 
the same.”64  Thus, minor differences in the marks, such as pluralization 
or an inconsequential modification or modernization of the later mark, 
will not preclude tacking.65  Likewise, a mark’s commercial impression is 
 
60. See, e.g., Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Survey Evidence:  Review of Current 
Trends in the Ninth Circuit, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 715, 715 (2005) 
(“Surveys represent the most scientific means of measuring relevant consumers’ subjective 
mental associations . . . .”); Ruth M. Corbin & Arthur Renaud, When Confusion Surveys 
Collide:  Poor Designs or Good Science?, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 781, 783 (2004) (“[T]he field 
of survey research incorporates all the essential structural techniques of other scientific 
expert evidence, including rigorous hypothesis testing, experimental design, control 
conditions and statistical inference.”). 
61. See, e.g., Patterson v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc., No. 03-C-0374, 2006 WL 
273527, at *17 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 31, 2006); Navistar Int’l Transp. Co. v. Freightliner Corp., No. 
96 C 6922, 1998 WL 911776 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 1998). 
62. Navistar, 1998 WL 911776, at *4 n.8 (“Our emphasis on the impressions of 
consumers is bolstered by Seventh Circuit precedent in an analogous trademark context—the 
‘likelihood of confusion’ test for infringement.”).  The Navistar court deemed irrelevant the 
fact that consumer perception evidence is not required to prove likelihood of confusion.  This 
was because the standard for tacking is even higher than it is for showing a likelihood of 
confusion.  Id. at *4. 
63. Id. at *4; see also Chesapeake Bank v. Chesapeake Bank of Maryland, Oppos. No. 
91114353, 2004 WL 240313 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 2004) (denying summary judgment as to priority 
in light of issues of fact relating to continuing commercial impression, including similarity of 
marks, context of their use, and customer perception). 
64. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sekisui Chem. Co., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 597, 603–04 
(T.T.A.B. 1970). 
65. See In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 513 (T.T.A.B. 1984), aff’d, 769 
F.2d 764 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that the marks DURANGOS and DURANGO are legal 
equivalents); In re Gear Int’l Trading Co., Serial Nos. 75/459,796, 75/459,797, 2001 WL 741709 
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not changed by the presence or absence of quotation marks or the use 
of different typefaces.66  McCarthy summarized the case law concerning 
a change of form: 
[T]he following changes have been held either not to constitute 
abandonment or to permit tacking-on:  a rearrangement of 
words; the combination of a mark with another word; the 
dropping of a non-essential word from a mark; adding a letter in 
a word without changing its phonetic impact; the dropping of a 
background design and continuing use of a word mark; the 
embellishment of a word or letter with a design; the insertion of a 
hyphen; a change in lettering style; and a modernization of a 
picture mark.67 
In one case, the court held that the modernization of the depiction of 
a lion into a more stylized drawing from earlier, more realistic versions 
did not constitute abandonment.68  In another case, the court held that 
trivial changes in the current VERYFINE trade dress from the drawings 
of the trademarks set forth in the registration certificates did not 
constitute abandonment.69  These changes included “the appearance of 
thin white line separations to the different sections of each orange and 
grapefruit [in the design], a slightly different position of the pineapple 
behind the orange in the pineapple orange design, and minor color 
changes in part of an orange section and pineapple rind.”70  The court 
concluded:  “The basic, overall commercial impression remains precisely 
the same.”71 
 
(T.T.A.B. June 29, 2001); Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1245 (D. Kan. 1977) 
(“Minor modifications of a trademark do not constitute abandonment.”). 
66. Bentwood Television Corp. v. Am. Theatre Wing, Inc., Cancel. No. 29,146, 2001 
WL 935809 (T.T.A.B. July 31, 2001) (finding that the registered mark was not abandoned 
merely because of occasional use of the mark without quotation marks, without pluralization, 
or in a different font). 
67. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 17:27; see also 3 ALTMAN, supra note 9, § 20:73 
(stating that no abandonment results from modernization of style, deletion of insignificant 
part of the mark, minor changes in punctuation, typeface, or descriptive verbal elements, or 
other minor changes in wording). 
68. Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1114–15 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
69. Veryfine Prods., Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240, 255 (D.P.R. 1992). 
70. Id. 
71. Id.; see also ASICS Corp. v. Wanted Shoes Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 25, 2005) (finding that while presentation of ASICS Stripe Design varied slightly 
depending on the footwear involved, it always created the same continuing commercial 
impression); Applebee’s Int’l, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., Oppos. No. 111,517, 
2003 WL 22134923, at *8 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 11, 2003) (concluding that SKILLET 
SENSATIONS in stylized form could be tacked to SKILLET SENSATIONS in block and 
slightly stylized letters, because “for all practical purposes, they are pronounced the same way 
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Second, courts have sometimes upheld tacking claims when 
additional words in one mark do not help identify the origin of the 
goods.  In one case, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals allowed 
AMERICAN SECURITY to be tacked onto AMERICAN 
SECURITY BANK, because the word “Bank” added “nothing to the 
origin-indicating significance” of the existing mark.72  Conversely, the 
owner of the mark HOME PROTECTION CENTER was not entitled 
to rely on the owner’s prior use of the mark HOME PROTECTION 
HARDWARE.73  The court in that case determined, on the basis of the 
words themselves, that the change from “center” to “hardware” created 
different commercial impressions rather than a mere change of form.74 
Similarly, the Board refused to permit AMERICAN 
MOBILPHONE PAGING to be tacked onto AMERICAN 
MOBILPHONE, because the two marks had identical star and stripe 
designs.75  The Board noted that the two marks were visually barely 
distinguishable.76  However, the Board concluded, in what it conceded 
was a close case, that the former mark and design conveyed more 
information to potential customers than did the latter mark and design, 
and the two marks were distinguishable when spoken.77   
Third, courts will not permit the tacking of a mark with a narrow 
commercial impression onto one with a broader commercial 
 
and project the same continuing commercial impression”); Rockline Indus., Inc. v. Dental 
Disposables Int’l, Inc., Cancel. No. 28,732, 2002 WL 187291 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 2002) (finding 
that FRESH N’ UP was the legal equivalent of FRESH ‘N UP, and that FRESHENUP was 
legal equivalent of FRESHEN UP, so tacking was permissible in both cases); S & L 
Acquisition Co. v. Helene Arpels, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1221 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (finding 
that ADRIEN ARPEL mark created continuing commercial impression whether represented 
in block form or in stylized lettering). 
72. Am. Sec. Bank v. Am. Sec. & Trust Co., 571 F.2d 564, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see also 
HGI Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. PepsiCo Inc., Nos. 93-55968, 93-56370, 1995 WL 89385, at *2 (9th 
Cir. Mar. 3, 1995) (“Taken as a whole, Taco Bell’s evidence was sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Taco Bell’s use of ‘Make a Run for the Border’ and ‘Run 
for the Border’ created the same commercial impression.”). 
73. See Ilco Corp. v. Ideal Sec. Hardware Corp., 527 F.2d 1221 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
74. See id. at 1224. 
75. See Am. Paging, Inc. v. Am. Mobilphone, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2036 
(T.T.A.B. 1989), aff’d, 923 F.2d 869 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
76. Id. at 2039. 
77. Id.; see also Ushodaya Enters., Ltd. v. V.R.S. Int’l, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 329, 338 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that “Priya” and its format did not create same continuing 
commercial impression as “Priya Pickles, Homemade by Vasudean Family”); Jimlar Corp. v. 
Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (finding that 
composite A CLUB mark, including the words BY AMERICAN EAGLE, could be tacked 
to A CLUB, because the marks created continuing commercial impression insofar as word 
“Club” was superimposed over the “A” in virtually identical manner). 
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impression.78  This restriction is designed to prevent a party seeking to 
tack from expanding its trademark rights, in accordance with established 
principles of trademark law.79  In one application of this rule, the district 
court rejected an attempt to tack after concluding that FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK has a narrower commercial impression than 
FIRSTBANK.80  In another case, the Ninth Circuit rejected an attempt 
to tack THE MOVIE BUFF’S MOVIE STORE to 
MOVIEBUFF.COM on the basis that the latter contained three fewer 
words, dropped the possessive, omitted a space, and added “.com” to 
the end.81  Other applications of this rule include failed attempts to tack 
SHAPE UP to later mark SHAPE,82 ALTER EGO to later mark 
EGO,83 and MARCO POLO to POLO.84 
Fourth, courts will not split marks into their component parts in 
determining whether they create a continuing commercial impression.  
Rather, courts evaluate the impression the marks as a whole create.  In 
one case, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that LONE STAR 
CAFÉ could be tacked onto LONE STAR STEAKHOUSE because 
both used the dominant term LONE STAR.85  Similarly, another court 
rejected a contention that KEY BANK was the legal equivalent of KEY 
FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK.86  Among other things, the latter mark 
 
78. Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
79. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. Freightliner Corp., No. 96 C 6922, 1998 WL 911776, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 1998). 
80. First Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1366, 1375 (D. Kan. 
1995).  The court distinguished two prior cases in which tacking was permitted.  In one, 
tacking was allowed onto a mark that was a modernized version of the same three-letter 
abbreviation.  First Mich. Bank Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 887 F.2d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  In 
the other case, the senior user had used THE FORUM mark for as long as it had been in 
business and had used the other versions of the mark—THE FORUM CORPORATION OF 
NORTH AMERICA and THE FORUM CORPORATION—only for limited periods.  
Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1990).  In this case, the term 
“Forum” was the single salient and memorable feature of all three marks. 
81. Brookfield Commc’n, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
82. Corporate Fitness Programs v. Weider Health & Fitness, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682 
(T.T.A.B. 1987). 
83. Viviane Woodard Corp. v. Roberts, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 840 (T.T.A.B. 1974); cf. 
Club Amenities, L.L.C. v. Pettenon Cosmetici SNC, Cancel. No. 92043178, 2005 WL 2034549, 
at *4 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2005) (“ALTER EGO THE PERSONAL CARE COMPANION 
creates same continuing commercial impression as [ALTER EGO]”). 
84. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Prods., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
85. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon v. Longhorn Steaks, 106 F.3d 355, modified by 122 
F.3d 1379 (11th Cir. 1997). 
86. See Keycorp v. Key Bank & Trust, 99 F. Supp. 2d 814 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
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imparted different and, arguably, more information than the former.87  
And the Board rejected an attempt to tack DIAMOND 
DESTINATIONS to AAA FIVE DIAMOND AWARD or AAA 
FOUR DIAMOND AWARD.88  The Board stated:  “[D]ue to the 
differences in overall sound, appearance and connotation created by the 
presence of the word ‘DESTINATIONS’ in petitioner’s ‘DIAMOND 
DESTINATIONS’ mark, such mark materially differs from each of the 
prior marks which it seeks to tack.”89 
Fifth, similarity of marks in connotation alone, when they are 
otherwise different in sight and sound, does not suffice to permit 
tacking.  In one case applying this rule, the Board determined that the 
mark HILL COUNTRY FARE could not be tacked onto the mark 
TASTE OF THE HILL COUNTRY.90  The two marks had no 
continuing commercial impression.91 
Cases applying the foregoing principles or rules have not 
demonstrated a great deal of consistency.  It is submitted that a root 
cause of the problem is the failure to adequately assess continuing 
commercial impression from the perspective of the consumer.  In 
tacking situations, and a few others described above, continuing 
commercial impression should be tested from the consumer perspective 
by treating the issue as a mixed question of fact and law.  The factual 
question should be resolved by resorting to survey evidence, when it is 
 
87. Id. at 821. 
88. See Am. Auto. Ass’n, Inc. v. Diamond Tours, Inc., Cancel. No. 22,491, 1997 WL 
796205 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 1997). 
89. Id. at *8 n.20; see also O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 65 F.3d 1041 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (finding that proposed use of OLYMPIC KIDS cannot be tacked to OLYMPIC 
mark); Universal City Studios L.L.L.P. v. Valen Brost, Oppos. No. 91153683, 2003 WL 
22415603, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 15, 2003) (“[C]onsidering the marks in their entireties, 
UNIVERSAL GAMES and UNIVERSAL TOYS do not ‘create the same, continuing 
commercial impression.’”); Impact Rests. L.L.C. v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., Cancel. No. 
92041064, 2003 WL 22586449 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 6, 2003) (finding that M.J. 
BARLEYHOPPER’S creates different commercial impression than that created by 
BARLEYHOPPERS and BARLEY HOPPERS); Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 11 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (concluding that applicant was not permitted to tack 
prior use of tiger design and slogan PUT A TIGER IN YOUR TANK for gasoline products 
to achieve priority of use for TIGER MART for convenience stores, because the marks were 
not recognized as one and the same). 
90. See H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Innovative Foods, L.L.C., Cancel. No. 92031423, 2003 
WL 22988721 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 17, 2003). 
91. Id.; see also Takahashi v. Bradley Imps., Ltd., Cancel. No. 92040069, 2004 WL 
1957209, at *5 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2004) (finding that WEST SIDE and skyline design mark 
could not be tacked onto WEST SIDE and floral design mark so as to avoid finding of 
abandonment). 
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available.  The next section of this Article describes two rare instances 
when consumer surveys were conducted for the purpose of being 
proffered as evidence of continuing commercial impression. 
II.  EMPIRICALLY DETERMINING CONTINUING COMMERCIAL 
IMPRESSION 
Although the proffering of consumer survey evidence has become 
commonplace in matters involving trademark confusion, acquired 
distinctiveness and secondary meaning, genericism, fame, and dilution, 
such evidence very infrequently has been submitted to support or rebut 
a claim of continuing commercial impression.  Research reveals a rare 
reported example in 2005 of such a proffer.92  An unreported earlier 
instance is known to the authors because of the junior author’s 
involvement in that matter.93  These two instances are described below, 
because they offer insights into the kinds of approaches that can and 
cannot be used to empirically assess continuing commercial impression. 
A.  Kubota Corp. et al. v. DaeDong-USA, Inc. 
Kubota Tractor Corporation, a California corporation, is affiliated 
with the Kubota Corporation of Japan.  As the name indicates, Kubota 
Tractor Corporation manufactures and sells tractors.  At or around the 
time Kubota introduced its tractors in the United States, other 
competitors included John Deere, Ford/New Holland (originally 
separate companies and, more recently, simply “New Holland”) and 
Massey-Ferguson.  For many years, each of these three tractor brands 
used a different primary color on the exteriors of their tractors:  John 
Deere used green; Ford/New Holland used blue; and Massey-Fergusson 
used red.  Since 1969, all Kubota tractors sold in the United States have 
had their bodies painted a bright orange color. 
In April of 2002, counsel acting on behalf of Kubota contacted the 
junior author with the request that he design and conduct an 
investigation to determine whether and, if so, to what extent Kubota’s 
trade dress had acquired distinctiveness and achieved secondary 
meaning in the minds of the relevant public.  The report of this 
investigation was then proffered as evidence in Kubota Corp. & Kubota 
Tractor Corp. v. DaeDong-USA, Inc. 
 
92. In re Lawman Armor Corp., Serial No. 75982984, 2005 WL 2451654 (T.T.A.B. 
Sept. 16, 2005). 
93. Kubota Corp. & Kubota Tractor Corp. v. DaeDong-USA, Inc., No. CIV-F-02-6013 
OWW (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002). 
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The defendant, another tractor manufacturer, was selling tractors in 
the United States under the name Kioti and had its tractor bodies 
painted in what, to the naked eye, appeared to be virtually identical to 
the shade of orange used on Kubota tractors.  At that point, DaeDong 
argued that since Kubota now used a shade of orange that differed 
somewhat from the shade of orange it had used originally, the secondary 
meaning survey could not be relied upon to establish secondary 
meaning for the original shade of orange.  As a consequence, in 2003, 
Kubota commissioned a second survey to determine whether, in the 
minds of relevant consumers, its new shade of orange conveyed a 
continuing commercial impression.  Inasmuch as the second (continuing 
commercial impression) survey can best be understood in terms of the 
first (secondary meaning) survey, both are described here. 
1.  The Secondary Meaning Survey 
The Universe.  As both parties sold tractors in the fifteen to sixty-five 
horsepower range, the relevant universe was defined as individuals who 
either decided, or helped decide, on the purchase of motorized farm or 
grounds equipment and either had bought, or in the next three years or 
so were likely to buy, a new or used tractor in the fifteen to sixty-five 
horsepower range.  Telephone directories were used to locate qualified 
respondents at farms, campground/RV parks, cemeteries, landscape 
contractors, land clearing and leveling firms, lawn services, golf courses, 
municipal governments and home owners with five or more acres.  In 
all, 222 qualified respondents were tested in twelve markets dispersed 
around the continental United States. 
The Test Stimuli.  Kubota manufactures and sells several tractor 
models in the fifteen to sixty-five horsepower range.  Had the 
investigation focused on only one of these, it could have been alleged 
that the survey’s findings were not representative of the other models.  
For this reason, the sample of respondents was divided into thirds, with 
respondents in each third being tested on a different model of Kubota 
tractor. 
Generally speaking, data is most informative when points of 
comparison are available.  For this reason, as well as to camouflage the 
brand of interest, the respondents in each of the three sub-samples were 
also tested on three other tractor brands in the same fifteen to sixty-five 
horsepower range:  a John Deere tractor, a Ford/New Holland tractor, 
and a Massey-Ferguson tractor. 
In most instances, it is preferable to provide respondents with actual 
exemplars of the product or package at issue so that, prior to their being 
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asked questions, they have an opportunity to examine these items as 
they normally would in the sales environment.  However, providing 
actual exemplars becomes highly impractical when the product at issue 
is too large to be moved to or accommodated in an enclosed testing 
facility (such as would be the case when testing several tractors), and 
when, as was the case here, multiple tractors are needed to be supplied 
so that respondents could be tested at various sites around the country.  
For this reason, each of the tractors used in this investigation was 
represented by color-faithful photographs showing four different 
angles—a direct frontal view, a direct side view, a three-quarter-side 
view taken from the front, and a three-quarter-side view taken from the 
rear.  These photographs were comparable to those appearing in sales 
brochures for tractors.  Inasmuch as this study sought to assess the 
secondary meaning or acquired distinctiveness of trade dress, so as to 
prevent the respondents from relying upon other source-identifying 
indicia, brand names and other source-identifying marks (e.g., logos) 
were removed from these photographs. 
The Testing Protocol.  The respondents reviewed the four photos for 
one of the four tractors.  Next, they were asked to identify its maker, if 
they thought they knew, and indicate the reason(s) why they thought 
the tractor came from the source they indicated.  The order in which the 
four tractors were shown to the respondents was rotated so that 
different respondents saw the sets in different orders.  Although all 
respondents saw photos of the same John Deere, Ford/New Holland 
and Massey-Ferguson tractors, as noted, the sample was divided into 
thirds, with each third seeing photos of a different Kubota model. 
The Questions Asked.  After looking at the four sets of photos for as 
long as they wished and then being cautioned not to guess when 
responding to the questions, the interviewer asked Question 1a for the 
first sets of photographs:  “If you know, who puts out the tractor shown 
in set #__?”  If the respondent did not name a manufacturer, the 
interviewer was instructed to say:  “By puts out, I mean manufactures.  
If you think you know, who manufactures the tractor shown in set #__?”  
If the respondent did not know, the interviewer put away the first set of 
photos, took out the second set, and repeated Question 1a for that set. 
 For each company named in Question 1a, the interviewer asked 
Question 1b:  “What is it about the tractor shown in photo __ that 
makes you think it is put out by (insert Respondent’s answer from 
Question 1a)?  What else, if anything, makes you say it is put out by 
(insert Respondent’s answer from Question 1a)?” 
 To clarify a potentially ambiguous answer, such as if the respondent 
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said “the color” or equivalent on Question 1b, the interviewer asked 
Question 1c:  “What is it about the (insert Respondent’s own words 
from Question 1b) that makes you say this tractor is put out by (insert 
Respondent’s answer from Question 1a).  Anything else?” 
Then the interviewer put away the first set of photos, took out the 
second set, and repeated the questions for that set.  The question 
sequence was repeated twice more, so that the respondent ended up 
being asked the same questions regarding each of the four photo sets.  
As noted, different respondents saw the sets in different orders. 
If the respondent had not provided any name in answer to Question 
1a, the interviewer took out the first photo set again and asked Question 
5a:  “Looking once again at the tractor shown in photo set #__, do you 
associate the color of this tractor with tractors put out by any particular 
company or companies?”  Respondents who said “yes” were asked 
Question 5b:  “With what particular tractor company or companies do 
you associate this color?  Any others?”  The interviewer then removed 
the first photo set and repeated the Question 5 sequence for the other 
photo sets to which a name had not been provided in answer to the 
earlier questions. 
Findings.  A large proportion of consumers who are users of, or in 
the market for, tractors in the fifteen to sixty-five horsepower range use 
color to identify the different brands of tractors.  Selected quotes 
illustrate this fact:  “All manufacturers make similar tractors.  [I] 
recognize them by color” (in response to John Deere photos); “Tractors 
have always been identified by colors.  And Massey’s has always been 
red” (in response to Massey-Ferguson photos); and “All tractor 
companies use one color for all their tractors and Massey’s is red” (in 
response to Massey-Ferguson photos). 
The fundamental question addressed by the secondary meaning 
survey was the following:  Had the color orange used on tractor 
exteriors come to signify Kubota in the minds of consumers forming the 
relevant universe?  The data revealed that 68% of the sample correctly 
identified the Kubota tractor and, when asked why, stated that the color 
orange was the reason they used for this identification.  To place this in 
perspective, although the 68% association between orange and Kubota 
is not as high as between green and John Deere (94%), it compares 
quite favorably to associations between blue and Ford/New Holland 
(65%) and is significantly greater than the association between red and 
Massey-Ferguson (43%).  This occurred, despite the fact that the latter 
two brands had been using their colors for a considerably longer period 
of time than Kubota had been using orange.  Illustrative quotes for 
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those identifying Kubota by its color are the following:  “If I see an 
orange tractor from a distance, I think Kubota.”; “Everything Kubota 
makes is orange and I don’t know of any other manufacturers using 
orange.”; “The orange color, you can spot one anywhere.  I always 
notice their color.”; “The orange color is distinctive of Kubota.  
Standard of Kubota.”; “They must have the rights to orange.  They are 
all orange.”; and “Kubota’s trademark color is orange.  I know that and 
this is the color of Kubota.” 
Conclusions.  Based upon these findings, it was concluded that the 
68% association between the color orange and Kubota tractors went 
well beyond satisfying the requirement for establishing acquired 
distinctiveness/secondary meaning and likely reached the point of 
qualifying the connection between orange and Kubota as being 
“famous” within this market. 
2.  The Continuing Commercial Impression Survey 
In the 1980s, the shade of orange used on Kubota tractors changed 
slightly.94  Because of this change, the defendant argued that even if 
secondary meaning was established by the first survey, the shade of 
orange that was the focus of that survey (Orange 2) was not the shade of 
orange for which secondary meaning had to be determined (namely, 
Orange 1).  Hence, counsel acting on behalf of Kubota commissioned 
another investigation to determine whether the slight change in the 
shade of orange used by Kubota resulted in the same “commercial 
impression” among relevant consumers.  As examination of case law 
turned up no prior instance in which a survey had been proffered to 
assess continuing commercial impression, the survey was designed de 
novo. 
The survey was conducted in twelve markets dispersed around the 
continental United States, with different respondents being drawn from 
the same universe as was defined for the secondary meaning survey.  
The test stimuli were the same as described for the secondary meaning 
survey with one exception, as described in the Testing Protocol section 
that follows. 
Testing Protocol.  The testing protocol involved two phases.  In 
Phase One, the 227 respondents reviewed photo sets of the same four 
tractors:  John Deere, Ford/New Holland, Massey-Fergusson and 
Kubota.  In contrast to the secondary meaning survey, in which the 
 
94. Hereinafter, “Orange 1” is used to refer to the shade used earlier while “Orange 2” 
is used to refer to the later shade. 
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respondents were shown the Kubota tractors in Orange 2, the set of 
photographs in Phase One of the continuing commercial impression 
survey used Orange 1.  The respondents were then asked the same 
questions as were asked in the secondary meaning survey.  The purpose 
of these questions was to see if the respondents could identify the maker 
of each tractor and, for those identified, to indicate the reasons why they 
thought the tractor came from the source they indicated. 
In Phase Two, the respondents were shown another set of 
photographs for the same four tractors.  The only difference between 
the sets was that, in Phase Two, the photographs of the Kubota tractor 
showed its exterior in Orange 2 (as had been the case in the secondary 
meaning survey).  Two questions were then asked to determine whether 
Orange 2 conveyed the same commercial impression as did Orange 1. 
Questions and Findings.  At the start of Phase Two, the respondents 
were shown the photographs for all four tractors (two photographs per 
tractor) and told the following:  “The shade of the color used for one of 
these tractors may, or may not, be different than the shade used in the 
photographs I showed you before.  As you look at these photos, do you 
see any tractor being shown in a different shade than before?”  In 
response, 84% of the respondents said that the Kubota shade of orange 
was the same.  For these consumers, seeing Orange 2 shortly after 
seeing Orange 1 and not detecting a difference, by necessary 
implication, means that Orange 2 conveyed the same commercial 
impression as did Orange 1. 
The 16% of the respondents who said the Kubota tractor shown in 
Phase Two was being shown in a different shade of orange than the 
Kubota tractor shown in Phase One were then asked the following:  
“Even if it is being shown in a different shade of the same color, do you 
think the shade being used here is, or is not, essentially the same as the 
shade used in the photo I showed you before?”  In response, half of 
these respondents (representing 8% of the entire sample) said the shade 
of orange being used on the photos in Phase Two was “essentially the 
same” as the shade of orange used in the Kubota tractor photos in 
Phase One.  For these consumers, seeing Orange 2 shortly after seeing 
Orange 1 also conveyed a continuing commercial impression. 
Conclusions.  Based upon finding that (84% + 8% =) 92% of 
qualified respondents found the two shades of Kubota orange either to 
be indistinguishable or, if distinguishable, to be essentially the same, it 
was concluded that the two shades of orange conveyed a continuing 
commercial impression.  Upon information and belief, the continuing 
commercial impression survey and its findings played a substantial role 
MARK.JACOBY ARTICLE - FORMATTED 6/3/2006  4:55:05 PM 
2006] CONTINUING COMMERCIAL IMPRESSION 455 
 
in the plaintiff obtaining a favorable pre-trial settlement. 
B.  In re Lawman Armor Corp. 
Lawman Armor Corporation sought to register THE 
UNBREAKABLE AUTOLOCK as a mark for metal anti-theft locks 
for motor vehicles, arguing that it represented a continuing commercial 
impression of THE UNBRAKEABLE AUTOLOCK, a mark for which 
it already held a registration.95  In support of its contention, it 
commissioned and proffered a consumer survey that the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office examining attorney deemed 
unpersuasive.96  Upon appeal, the Board similarly concluded:  “We do 
not find the results of the applicant’s survey persuasive.”97  The survey is 
described as follows: 
The survey was comprised of 200 owners of automobiles who 
have used automobile anti-theft devices sampled from ten 
different cities.  The respondents were divided into two groups, 
each presented with one of two lists displaying the names and 
logos of five brands of automobile anti-theft devices.  The names 
on the two lists were identical except for the display of the 
applicant’s mark on one list in the form [THE 
UNBRAKEABLE AUTOLOCK PRO and in the form THE 
UNBREAKABLE AUTOLOCK PRO on the other]. 
 Of the 200 respondents, 97 were given the list of names with 
the UNBRAKEABLE version of the designation and 103 were 
given the list with the UNBREAKBLE version.  The 
respondents in each group were asked to identify which of the 
devices, if any, shown on the list (1) they had ever used, (2) they 
had seen or heard of, and (3) they had seen or heard advertising 
for.  The survey shows that 11 participants in the group shown 
the “UNBRAKEABLE” spelling (or 11%) and 8 participants 
shown the “UNBREAKABLE” spelling (or 8%) indicated they 
had seen or heard of the mark.  Applicant concludes, based on 
the survey results, that any minor difference between the marks 
will not be perceived by consumers.98 
Among other criticisms, the examining attorney faulted the survey 
for not presenting respondents with the marks at issue and for findings 
that were statistically insignificant.99  On appeal, the applicant argued 
 
95. In re Lawman, 2005 WL 2451654, at *1. 
96. Id. at *3. 
97. Id. at *4. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at *4. 
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that the former criticism somehow cut against its interests while, insofar 
as the latter was concerned, it was proper to rely on small samples for 
“directional evidence.”100  In its ruling, the Board wrote: 
 We find the survey fails to show, or even measure, the 
identity or continuity in commercial impression of the marks at 
issue in this case.  The most significant problem is that the two 
designations presented to the respondents were neither the 
marks contained in the prior registrations nor the mark for which 
registration is now sought and they differed from the marks in 
significant ways. . . . Moreover, the small number of relevant 
participants undercuts the reliability of the survey even if it had 
been a survey directed to the marks actually at issue in this 
proceeding. 
 At best, the survey shows what we already know; that the 
marks have some similarities.  However, the survey is entitled to 
little probative value on the question of whether the two marks 
are perceived as the same.101 
C.  Insights Gained by Comparing the Surveys in Kubota and Lawman 
Armor 
Kubota involved trade dress while Lawman involved a word mark.  
Apart from these differences, the surveys conducted in these cases differ 
in substantial respects, thereby having implications for those who would 
seek to measure continuing commercial impression in the future. 
Arguably, the most important difference between the two surveys is 
that, using color-faithful photographs of as-sold tractors, the survey in 
Kubota tested the trade dress as it appeared in the marketplace (e.g., in 
sales brochures) while the survey in Lawman failed to show, or even 
measure, the impression of the marks at issue in that case.  Apparently, 
any survey seeking to measure continuing commercial impression would 
do well to test the mark or dress as it is used in the marketplace. 
The surveys in the two matters also differed in terms of testing and 
demonstrating that a commercial impression existed in the minds of 
relevant consumers, or that the commercial impression was a continuing 
one.  Specifically, after the first Kubota survey established that Kubota’s 
current orange had acquired secondary meaning (namely, it possessed a 
clear commercial impression among relevant consumers), the second 
Kubota survey directly tested and was able to demonstrate that, for the 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at *5. 
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overwhelming majority of respondents, the current shade of orange was 
perceived as being the same as the original shade of orange (thereby 
showing that the commercial impression continued between the first 
and second shades).  In contrast, the survey in Lawman failed to directly 
test or demonstrate either that the UNBRAKEABLE or 
UNBREAKABLE marks conveyed a clear commercial impression to 
anything like the majority of respondents, or that the second mark 
(UNBREAKABLE) was perceived as being the same as the first. 
As to the issue of sample size, from the standpoint of statistics, as 
long as the respondents are representative of the relevant consumer 
population as a whole, there is little wrong with sample sizes of one 
hundred.  The substantive issue is the proportion of respondents out of 
the group who respond in a consistent and material way and, 
specifically, whether that proportion is the vast majority or a small 
minority.  Clearly, there is a difference between showing that 92% of a 
sample of prospective purchasers find the two shades of Kubota orange 
to be indistinguishable or essentially the same, versus showing that 11% 
of participants claimed to have seen or heard of the UNBRAKEABLE 
mark.102 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The continuing commercial impression of a trademark is significant 
in a variety of contexts.  Such contexts include, but are not limited to, 
abandonment and tacking, Rule 2.41(b), claim preclusion, and the 
Morehouse defense.  In each of these situations, the critical issue for 
most courts is whether two marks are legal equivalents—i.e., whether in 
the minds of consumers, the two marks are the same.  While a number 
of courts considering the subject have concluded that legal equivalence 
is a pure question of law, this conclusion is infirm.  It is submitted that 
legal equivalence—like confusing similarity—presents a mixed question 
of law and fact.  The question is one that should be resolved by 
consideration of a range of evidence, including consumer survey 
evidence, when it is available and admissible.   
Set forth herein is a discussion of two rare empirical assessments of 
continuing commercial impression in the context of trade dress and 
word-mark infringement.  In describing the surveys used to make those 
assessments, our principal objective has been to call attention to the 
 
102. A fuller discussion of the issue of sample size may be found in Jacob Jacoby et al., 
Survey Evidence in Deceptive Advertising Cases Under the Lanham Act:  An Historical 
Review of Comments from the Bench, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 541, 572–75 (1994). 
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proposition that just as consumer survey evidence has become 
commonplace in other areas of trademark litigation, such empirical 
assessment is also possible when determining whether or not a 
continuing commercial impression is being conveyed to the public.  The 
two-phased approach used in Kubota is but one approach.  No doubt, 
other appropriate approaches can be and should be developed.  In 
particular, the Kubota surveys focused on trade dress, specifically color.  
Yet marks are more often conveyed verbally, symbolically and 
sometimes acoustically, and approaches for empirically assessing the 
continuing commercial impression of such marks also require 
development. 
 
